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HOSPITAL EMERGENCY SERVICE AND 
THE OPEN DOOR 
Leonard S. Powers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
COMPARED to its antecedents, the modern hospital is a revolu-tionary institution. Until this century the community hospital 
was little more than a rooming house to which the transient sick were 
taken and from which most never left. It served to isolate, with 
minimum care, those who could not afford medical treatment at 
home, especially those with contagious diseases who could be a 
burden and threat to the well. Today, the hospital is a complex 
center of activity-a vast assemblage of superbly trained and highly 
specialized talent and expensive equipment devoted to healing those 
suffering from accident or disease. No longer is it only for the im-
poverished sick; all strata of our society come to it and all demand 
that the very best in medical technology and skill be available to 
them.1 And as the complexity and expense of operating the hospitals 
increased, they began to take on a distinctly business-like appearance 
much unlike that of the earlier charity-oriented organizations. One 
significant aspect of this development was the eventual demise of the 
charitable immunity doctrine as applied to hospitals.2 
One department of the hospital subjected to especially rapid 
change in recent years has been the emergency service. Every section 
of the country notes a tremendous increase in public demand for 
emergency room services.3 That "the public has taken to the emer-
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Florida. A.B. 1940, Duke 
University; J.D. 1950, University of North Carolina; LL.M. 1956, Duke University. 
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1. See HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBUC INTEREST 293 (J. Knowles ed. 1965); 
Davis, The Hospital's Position in American Society, in MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL 
ADMINISTRATION 7-16 (J. Owen ed. 1962). 
2. For a detailed analysis of the status of the doctrine in the various states see 
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); 3 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 741 (1965). The reasons 
for the change undoubtedly arise from the changing pattern of financial support for 
hospitals. See Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 
(1950); President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Davis, supra note 1, at 11. 
3. In an Ohio study over an eight-year period, the increase per year ranged from 
10% to almost 20%. See Seifert &: Johnstone, Meeting the Emergency Department 
Crisis, 40 HOSPITALS 55 (1966). The American Hospital Association found a 175% 
increase in emergency room visits between 1954 and 1964. A.M.A. Department of 
Hospitals and Medical Facilities, The Emergency Department Problem-An Overview, 
198 J.A.M.A. 380 (1966) [hereinafter 198 J.A.M.A.]. The increase for some hospitals 
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gency department like a duck to water"4 is certainly no exaggeration; 
it may be an understatement. While the propriety of such a magni-
fied role for the emergency room in the total treatment context is 
far from clear, and, indeed, is the subject of a continuing dialogue 
within the medical profession, 5 the increased emphasis is already with 
us. Like the shift in hospital practices which led to the rapid demise 
of the charitable immunity doctrine, so will this development force 
changes in the law. This Article will focus on the emerging duty of 
hospital emergency rooms to treat patients seeking their aid. 6 
Before discussing that question, it is helpful to examine the 
changes in emergency room practices in greater detail. The emer-
gency room was originally what its name implies-a place for the 
treatment of severe injuries and diseases demanding immediate at-
tention. 7 Its location was usually in some remote part of the hospital. 
It had no organizational status as a department, and the quality of 
care rendered there was usually below the general standard for the 
hospital.8 The emergency room of a modem hospital is a drastically 
different place.9 Now the public goes to the emergency room for 
has been as high as 600% in six years. See Stichter, Medical Staffing of Emergency 
Rooms: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 62 THE OHIO STATE MEDICAL J. 600 (1966); 
Foster, Public Discovers Where Care Is: Emergency Rooms, 106 THE MoDERN Hos-
PITAL 77 (1966). 
4. Blalock, Emergency Care, 40 HOSPITALS at 51 (1966). 
5. For example, see Bergen, Legal Aspects of Emergency Departments, in EMER· 
GENCY DEPARTMENT 109 (1966): "Emergency medical care might be defined as care 
necessary to sustain life or maintain health that cannot be delayed"; Letourneau, 
Legal Aspects of the Hospital Emergency Room, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. R.Ev. 50 (1967). 
6. "Private Hospital" as used herein means any hospital which is not a public 
hospital. A public hospital is one owned, operated, and supported by government. Van 
Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554, aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 
147 N.E. 219 (1924). The responsibility of public hospitals will be treated to the ex-
tent not governed by statute since the common-law duties are, in general, the same 
for both public and private hospitals except where changed by statute. While some 
statutes creating public hospitals do not specifically grant persons the right to be 
admitted, they do state requirements that may by implication create rights of admis-
sion to such hospitals. Such admission requirements typically relate to residence and 
financial status of the person seeking admission. An occasional statute provides that 
governmental hospitals are for "the benefit of the inhabitants of such county and of 
any person falling sick or being injured or maimed within its limits." FLA. STAT. 
§ 155.16 (1965). Under such provisions, hospitals may be under a duty to admit persons 
for emergency treatment. · 
7. Stichter, supra note 3, at 600. 
8. Meyer, The Hospital Emergency Department-New Functions and Responsi• 
bilities, 40 PoSTGRAD. MEDICINE 374 (1966). For many years it has been the weakest and 
most neglected department in the hospital. 198 J.A.M.A. 380. For a comparison of in• 
patient and outpatient services see Seifert &: Johnstone, supra note 3, at 57. 
9. The change has been expressed as follows: "From a single room with one or two 
treatment tables, a few intravenous stands, and perhaps a cabinet of drugs, the 'emer• 
gency room' has now expanded into a many-chambered area with facilities for many 
types of examination and treatment." Noer, Critical Surgery Belongs in O.R., Not E.R., 
106 THE Mon. HosP. 92 (1966). 
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treatment of all kinds of injuries and illnesses.10 The number and 
volume of services demanded have resulted in some emergency rooms 
becoming, in effect, complete miniature hospitals.11 The United 
States Public Health Service predicts 49.3 million annual emergency 
room visits by 1970 compared to only 32.1 million ordinary hospital 
admissions. This is a 79 per cent increase, per 1,000 population, in 
the use of the emergency room compared to an 8 per cent increase 
in ordinary admissions over the 1960 figures.12 
It is quite clear, then, that the public considers the emergency 
room to be a community medical center.13 It is the only place where 
the best equipment and facilities and at least some care are available 
on any day, at any hour, and without appointment. It does not re-
quire the presence of the sometimes unavailable family doctor.14 In 
fact, one explanation for this development is undoubtedly the con-
current disappearance of the traditional family doctor and the house 
call, and the advent of the clinic, regular office hours, and doctors' 
days off. 
Yielding to the demands of the public and to the changing struc-
ture of their profession, some physicians and hospital administrators 
have challenged the profession to bring about a wholesale expansion 
of emergency facilities and organization.15 There are those who feel 
that no one who comes to the emergency room desiring treatment 
should be turned away-even if no true emergency exists. There is 
a feeling that what may not be an "emergency" to the physician may 
nevertheless be one for the patient and that hospitals must accept 
IO. Blalock, supra note 4, at 51-52. 
11. Noer, supra note 9, at 92. 
12. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND .WELFARE, HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT SER-
VICES: FACTS AND TRENDS, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 14-15 (No. 930-C-6 1964). 
13. This development has caused some to characterize the emergency room as a 
"neighborhood drop-in clinic." Stichter, supra note 3, at 600. 
14. Many explanations for the new pattern of emergency room use are given. 
Stichter feels the major reason is "the public's general acceptance . • • of the idea 
that hospital facilities ••• should be available for all kinds of illnesses and injuries-
the idea that the hospital emergency room should be a sort of community medical 
center." Stichter, supra note 3, at 601. For other explanations, see MODERN CONCEPTS 
OF HOSPITAL .ADMINISTRATION, supra note I, at 330; Vaughan &: Gamester, Why Patients 
Use Hospital Emergency Departments, 40 HoSPs. 59 (1966); 198 J.A.M.A. 380; Seifert &: 
Johnstone, supra note 3, at 58. 
15. Foster, supra note 3, at 78. Faced with overwhelming demand, many hospitals 
have been modifying their emergency room physical plants, staff arrangements, and 
technical services. While the quality of care has been improved, there is as yet no 
generally accepted procedure for rendering emergency care. The immediate concern 
of the patient centers on the competency, efficiency, and speed of the service rendered 
to him, particularly if he has a true emergency. His welfare depends directly upon 
the emergency room procedure, i.e., whether it calls for care or evaluation by a nurse, 
intern, or licensed physician and whether it provides for rapid and efficient rendition 
of service. 
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the public's conception of the emergency room as a place to get 
medical aid rapidly with a minimum of administrative complication. 
Others, resisting extension into nonemergency cases, admonish their 
colleagues to return the emergency room to its original function. 
Attempts have been made to re-educate the public concerning the 
true function of the emergency room,16 but the public, now accus-
tomed to relying on the hospital emergency room for these vital 
services, has not been willing to be re-educated.17 
There is some agreement, however, on what an ideal emergency 
room should be. First, if there is reasonable doubt whether medical 
care beyond "first-aid" is required, this judgment should be made 
by a licensed physician.18 Some cases are obviously not emergencies 
and are not presented or claimed to be such. These "first-aid" cases 
do not require treatment by a licensed physician; anyone can give 
such aid within the limits of his competency. Whether these cases will 
be treated by the emergency staff or redirected to more suitable 
sources of assistance depends on the defined role of that particular 
center. But where an "emergency" is claimed, at least the determina-
tion should never be made by a nurse, orderly, aide, or clerk. Many 
hospitals in practice go beyond this minimal requirement and re-
quire treatment of emergency room cases by a licensed physician.19 
There is general agreement that a patient presenting himself to the 
emergency room should not be dismissed, discharged, or transferred 
without the approval of a .licensed physician.20 
Yet it is clear from scattered comments and some reported cases 
that many emergency rooms do not provide the services of a licensed 
16. A Maryland hospital used radio announcements, newspaper stories, and bro-
chures. Foster, supra note 3, at 78. For an account of another attempt to cope with 
the problem see How One Small Hospital Enlarged Emergency Room, 106 THE MoD. 
HOSP. 87 (1966); T. FUNT, EMERGENCY TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 3 (3d ed. 1964): 
the ratio between urgent and nonurgent cases is as high as ten to one. • • • As a 
result, facilities designed, equipped and staffed for handling emergency condi-
tions have been swamped with nonurgent patients at times when care of true 
emergencies suddenly and unexpectedly has become imperative. 
17. The reason for the public's attitude has been compared to the thiefs reply to 
why he robbed banks: "Because that's where the money is." Foster, supra note 3, at 78. 
18. See Bergen, supra note 5, at 110. 
19. Stichter, supra note 3, at 604; MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION, 
supra note 1, at 333; Letourneau, supra note 5, at 57; T. Flint, supra note 16, at 88. 
20. E. HAYT, LAW OF HOSPITAL AND NURSE 112 (1958); MODERN CONCEPTS OF Hos-
PITAL ADMINISTRATION, supra note 1, at 333. One emergency treatment system devel-
opment is the type instituted in the Yale-New Haven Hospital in 1963. This "medical 
triage" system emphasizes the screening of true emergencies from cases in which time 
is not of the essence by physicians. This system appears successful in increasing ef-
ficiency and the quality of patient care, [Weiner, Rutzen, &: Pearson, Effects of Medical 
"Triage" in Hospital Emergency Service, 80 PUB. HEALTH REP. 389 (1965)] but it has 
not been adopted as standard procedure on a national scale by hospitals nor has it 
been required by law. 
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physician.21 In three cases that resulted in death, nurses turned 
people away from the emergency room without being seen by an 
intern, resident, or staff physician.22 In other cases, patients were 
transferred23 or discharged24 by interns without examination or ap-
proval by a physician. Where a physician was summoned for 
treatment or decision, there may have been undue delay.25 Even 
where a physician ordered discharge, there have been instances in 
which he was ignorant of the patient's condition.26 
The most shocking aspect of the emergency room situation, how-
ever, is not the inadequate procedure or substandard quality of care 
provided, but the fact that these vital services are not necessarily 
available to the stricken patient who presents himself for emergency 
care. Following the traditional common-law rule that there is no 
affirmative duty to render emergency aid to another human being 
who is in peril, private and most public hospitals may legally refuse 
aid in an emergency case.27 This rule, rather surprising in this con-
text, is mitigated by the stated standards of the medical profession 
which are directed toward providing prompt and effective aid to all 
emergency patients.28 
Surely no emergency treatment has even been denied solely be-
cause of the legal right of the hospital to refuse treatment. It is to be 
21. Seifert &: Johnstone, supra note 3, at 58: "[T]he physical presence of competent, 
licensed physicians in hospital emergency departments currently is in the process of 
changing the community standards of emergency medical service in hospitals." 
22. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other 
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 
S.2d ·15 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 
202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). 
23. Jones v. City of New York, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 286 App. 
Div. 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955); Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 
S.W.2d 475 (1961). 
24. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957). 
25. The standard established by the American College of Surgeons calls for treat-
ment by a physician within 15 minutes after arrival in the emergency room. Stan-
dards for Emergency Department in Hospital, 48 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE 
OF SURGEONS 112 (1963). In Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951), 
nine hours elapsed before the physician first saw the patient who had suffered a 
fractured skull in an automobile wreck. 
26. Reeves v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 191 S.2d 307, 308 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 
Fla. 1966): "Dr. Moorhead ••• did not see or treat Eddie but signed his discharge 
slip.'' 
27. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934); Olander 
v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 
432, 21 Am. R. 529 (1876). 
28. Letourneau, supra note 5, at 51, notes that all statements of standards seem to 
agree that emergency room arrangements should insure promptness or immediacy of 
care. The standards of The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals require 
that the emergency service provide "adequate medical and nursing personnel available 
at all times.'' AMERICAN HOSPITAL AssOCIATION, HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION REFERENCES 
137 (1964). 
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expected, on the other hand, that treatment might be refused if the 
case is nonemergent or if the emergency facilities are full. There 
have, however, been other reasons given for failure to give emergency 
room treatment which do not comport so readily with the physician's 
creed: lack of referral to the hospital, membership in a disfavored 
medical insurance group,29 pre-emergency care by another doctor,30 
or contagious disease.31 Other grounds of refusal to treat include 
discrimination on grounds of race, emergency room personnel being 
unable to locate a physician, or simply that the facility is closed.32 
Whatever the emergency room's status as part of the hospital 
organization, the quality of care given, or the procedures followed, 
most of those charged with the operation of hospitals are aware of 
the new role thrust upon the emergency room. Many administrators 
and physicians are motivated by a :recognition that the public is 
entitled to better service than is presently available.33 Our question 
concerns how the law will cope with the expectations of the public 
and the generally sympathetic response of hospital officials and the 
healing professions. What should the law require as a minimum, 
with a tort action against the hospital becoming available if that 
minimum is not met? We begin with the shocking proposition that 
present law in most American jurisdictions is said to permit a hos-
pital to keep its doors closed to the person seeking emergency medical 
aid. 
II. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. The General Common-Law Rule and its Exceptions 
Whether a hospital must render emergency medical services to 
the sick and injured is a question residing in that branch of tort law 
relating to coming to the aid of someone in peril. It will be helpful, 
therefore, to examine briefly some of the general principles that 
have emerged in this area. 
Basic to the older common law was the distinction between action 
and inaction-benveen misfeasance and nonfeasance. Liability was 
29. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). 
30. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other 
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
31. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934). 
32. Horty, Emergency Care-or Lack of It-Can Make a General Hospital Liable, 
96 THE Moo. HosP. 106 (1961). Statutory prohibitions against racial and religious dis-
crimination prohibit exclusion from admission on such criteria, but do not in them-
selves create a right to be admitted. 
33. Churchill, The Development of the Hospital, in THE HOSPITAL IN CONTEM-
PORARY LIFE 68 (N. Faxon ed. 1949); Stichter, supra note 3, at 601. 
May 1968] Hospital Emergency Service 1461 
imposed for intentional or negligent misfeasance but not for non-
feasance or failure to act. Affirmative action resulting in harm to 
another was a breach of duty resulting in liability but mere 
failure to intervene to benefit another-even to save him from 
serious harm-was not considered actionable since there was no duty 
to act in the first instance.34 Justification for this distinction has been 
found in the individualistic philosophy of the traditional common 
law; it refused to restrict a man's freedom by imposing a sort of 
forced labor in the form of a duty to be helpful to those in distress.35 
Charity began and ended at home, and even there, as evidenced by 
the family immunities, there was very little. 
As social institutions and relationships became more complex, 
the courts were required to reconsider the subtle problem of inac-
tion. Liability slowly developed for nonfeasance under some cir-
cumstances; where warranted, judicial exceptions developed to the 
general rule of no liability for nonfeasance. 
One exception developed in cases in which the defendant en-
gaged in some sort of prior affirmative action placing the plaintiff 
in peril.36 There had long been a duty to come to the aid of another 
if one tortiously put another person in peril, but this, of course, could 
be characterized as misfeasance. The duty has been significantly ex-
tended to those who innocently cause such bodily harm to another 
as to leave him helpless and in danger of further harm.37 Further, if 
by one's prior affirmative act a force is innocently set in motion 
which threatens peril, then he must act to prevent the risk from 
taking effect.38 The common thread that knits these situations to-
gether is the defendant's connection with the risk that has thrust the 
plaintiff into a position of peril. 
A second execption to the no duty to act rule developed where 
the defendant undertook to confer a benefit upon another, and that 
person suffered harm because of his reliance upon the undertaking.39 
Even when there is no prior contractual duty to engage in the under-
taking, certain duties are assumed when such a voluntary undertak-
ing begins. To take a well-known example, a railroad which under-
takes to maintain a traffic signalman at a street crossing takes on the 
34. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE I.Aw OF TORTS 334 (3d ed. 1964); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND} OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
35. Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 C0Lu11r. L. REv. 631 
(1952.) 
36. For a classification similar to that presented here see 2 F. HARPER &: F. JAMES, 
THE I.Aw OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956). 
37. REsl"ATEllrENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965). 
38. Id. § 321; W. PROSSER, supra note 34, at 338. 
39. REsTATElltENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
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duty to perform that function with due care.40 Liability extends 
beyond misfeasance in affirmative acts undertaken to include liability 
for negligent failure to perform the undertaking at all when per-
formance was reasonably to be expected. The duty to continue to aid 
another who is helpless when a discontinuance would leave the other 
in a worse position than when the defendant took charge of him is 
within this exception.41 
A third exception bases a duty to act upon some special relation-
ship-some special dependence-between the defendant and the 
person in peril. There are duties to aid and protect imposed 
upon employers,42 common carriers, innkeepers, and invitors,43 but 
other relationships of dependence may also impose a similar duty as, 
for example, public utility and customer. Most of these special re-
lationships are found where there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties, or at least a potentiality of contract. 
The residual applicability of the general rule after these excep-
tions have taken their due may be illustrated by the hypothetical 
familiar to all first-year law students: a man walking along a river 
bank sees a small child drowning in shallow water but ignores its 
calls for help even though he is a competent swimmer. This may be 
cruel and morally wrong, but there is no legal duty to rescue. Here, 
there is a completely fortuitous chain of events which places one 
person in a situation where he has the power to alleviate the distress 
of another. This is the factual situation where the courts and com-
mentators still assert that there is no legal duty to assist the one in 
peril. 
Liability for failure to aid another in peril, then, cannot today 
be determined without full appreciation of the factual context. 
Slight variations in facts bring important exceptions into operation; 
these exceptions, in turn, permit recovery where the general rule 
would deny it. Therefore, it is important to know how the courts 
have categorized the encounters between persons suffering medical 
emergencies and the hospitals maintaining emergency services. 
B. Recent Hospital Cases-An Overview 
The general rule has been stated to be that persons do not 
possess any right to be admitted to a hospital and that a hospital is 
40. Erie R.R. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 
(1930). 
41. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965). 
42. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(b) (1965). 
43. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
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not obliged to accept a patient not desired by it nor even to assign 
a reason for refusal to admit.44 As the rule is stated, there is no ex-
ception for medical emergencies or emergency rooms. This rule is 
said to apply to all private hospitals and to public hospitals in the 
absence of a statutory duty. 
Most of the statutes creating rights to treatment apply only 
to public hospitals. One exception is the Illinois statute, which 
imposes a duty-applicable both to public and private hospitals 
where surgical operations are performed-to give emergency medical 
treatment or first aid to any person who applies.45 Most statutes au-
thorizing the creation of governmental hospitals limit hospital use 
to persons with some defined relationship to the governmental unit 
supporting the institution.46 A person coming within the statutory 
class probably has an implied right to admission although the statutes 
create no express right. Some statutes provide for waiver of the 
normal admission requirements for treatment in emergency cases.47 
If this is so, then absent some statute, it would seem to follow 
that a hospital cannot be held civilly liable for nonadmittance and 
consequent nontreatment. Yet, in nine out of eleven recent cases to 
be discussed below the courts held the hospital liable. Although in 
three of the nine cases the hospital may have done something it 
should not have done,48 in at least six of the cases it appears that the 
courts found that the hospital should have done something which it 
failed to do. 49 On one theory or another, exceptions to the general 
rule were found to exist. The theory most frequently used has been 
the concept of a voluntary undertaking to render aid. The opinions, 
unfortunately, generally fail to specify the essential elements which 
amount to an undertaking or the extent of the duty assumed once 
44. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934). Opinions in 
other emergency room cases usually begin with a statement that this is a general rule. 
45. !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 111½ §§ 86-87 (1966). Although the statute contains only a 
criminal penalty for failure to comply, a duty to provide care could be based upon it 
so as to result in civil liability on a defendant hospital violating it. 
46. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 124-4-3 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 155.16 (1965). 
47. ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § ll-297A (1956); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7301 (McKin-
ney 1961). This type of statutory provision may imply that the public hospital should 
treat all emergency cases without screening for the statutory requirements. 
48. Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Reeves v. North Broward 
Hospital District, 191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966); Barcia v. Society of New 
York Hospital, 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
49. Wilmington Gen. Hospital v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other 
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Le Jeune Road Hospital, Inc. v. Watson, 171 
S,2d 202 (Ct. App. Fla. 1965); New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 146 
S,2d 882 (1962); O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital, 11 App. Div.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 
(1960); Jones v. City of New York, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 143 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1955); Methodist Hospital v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 
S,W.2d 475 (1961). 
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an undertaking is found to have occurred. The legal obligations of 
the hospital confronting a medical emergency, then, have not been 
adequately formulated. 
This sort of conceptual uncertainty is not uncommon where the 
courts are confronted with seriously conflicting policies. The urge 
to deny any duty to render aid springs from the individualistic no-
tion that one should be able to set one's own policies for rendering a 
gratuitous service. The existence of a duty might also impose a 
tremendous burden on smaller hospitals, draining financial and 
manpower resources to the point of forcing some of these institu-
tions to abandon the emergency service altogether. While liability 
insurance might soften the financial blow, the adverse publicity 
generated by allowing such suits could be equally damaging. On 
the other hand, ethical and moral pressures to assist another human 
being in an emergency have strong appeal in such cases. The result 
of a hospital's lack of treatment is often serious: in all but one of the 
eleven cases death ensued. 
Conceptual difficulties aside, it appears that the general rule of 
no duty to render aid is not actually shielding hospitals from civil 
liability in emergency room cases, and this is a reliable indication of 
judicial dissatisfaction with that rule. A narrow path must be 
walked if hospital liability is to be avoided. Indeed, there may be no 
reliable path. In at least one jurisdiction the only sure way to avoid 
liability is apparently to accept the person in distress who appears at 
the emergency room and render with due care whatever emergency 
assistance is necessary. 50 On similar facts one other jurisdiction has 
reached the same result in substance if not in theory.51 How close 
other courts will come to imposing liability for turning patients 
away at the door is uncertain because few of these cases arise. Hos-
pitals do not ordinarily turn away summarily those who appear ask-
ing for emergency aid; thus there are no modern cases for the general 
rule to operate upon. Each case seems to fit an exception. 
C. Recent Hospital Cases-A Factual Analysis 
The eleven recent cases mentioned earlier comprise much of the 
authority on the subject of hospital liability for nontreatment. Since 
the facts of each case are critical in determining whether some excep-
tion to the general rule is applicable, each case will be discussed in 
some detail. Certain factual patterns, however, are discernible and 
50. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, aff'd on other 
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
51. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). 
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form a framework for analysis. The eleven cases, then, fit into five 
factual patterns. 
I. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid to the 
applicant and then released him with the mutual understanding 
that he was in no better condition than before. 
Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews.52 A child suffering from 
diphtheria was taken to a private hospital. The house physician ren-
dered treatment, consisting of a throat swab, oxygen, and two injec-
tions of antitoxin. There was a dispute concerning whether the anti-
toxin temporarily weakened the child's condition. After this treat-
ment the superintendent required the family to take the child home 
because hospital regulations forbade accepting patients with con-
tagious diseases. Within fifteen minutes after returning home the 
child died. 
Crews, which denied recovery to the plaintiff, was the first im-
portant case on the question in the recent past. It is usually cited as 
the leading case for the general rule that there is no right to be ad-
mitted to a private hospital. Because it did not deal with the failure 
to give emergency aid to a person coming to the emergency room, it 
is precise authority only on the question of the duty of a hospital to 
admit a person for ordinary hospital services. In fact, the court 
found that emergency treatment had been provided by the hospital; 
the issue was whether the hospital had a duty to provide more than 
that. While recognizing that a hospital may create a duty to provide 
even ordinary hospital services by undertaking to act, the court 
provided no guidelines as to how or when such a duty comes into 
existence. It merely held that rendering emergency care alone will 
not create a duty to render ordinary, nonemergency, hospital ser-
vices, especially when the patient is suffering from a contagious dis-
ease. 
Crews is an example of rendering aid and sending the patient 
away with the mutual understanding that he is in no better condi-
tion than before treatment. It is completely consistent with the gen-
eral tort law with respect to the duty to aid one in peril. The hospital 
provided aid and, although its help conferred no particular benefit, 
it did not make the condition worse. Crews cannot be regarded as a 
case of failure to admit or failure to render emergency aid; if a 
·wrong was committed, it would be wrongful discharge or abandon-
ment. On the lack of duty to render emergency treatment, the 
52. 229 Ala. 398, 157 S. 224 (1934). 
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principle for which it has so often been cited, the Crews case con-
tains only dicta. Furthermore, in an age of rapidly expanding medical 
facilities and changing socio-institutional attitudes, Crews is thirty-
four years old. 
It may be, however, that the Crews rule of no duty to accept a 
prospective patient for ordinary hospital services has been extended 
by other courts to emergency room services. This is not to say that 
such a rule has been applied to limit hospital liability; rather, it is 
inferred from the many judicial efforts in emergency room cases to 
find some exception to the "general rule." In other words, courts 
have generally dealt with emergency room cases as though the Crews 
dictum were settled law. One reason for this assumption, of course, 
was that it fit into the lack-of-duty position of nonfeasance cases gen-
erally. 
2. After the hospital exercised control, it kept the applicant for 
some period of time without giving aid and then sent him else-
where for aid. 
Methodist Hospital v. Ball.53 A young automobile accident victim 
was carried to the emergency room of the hospital at 11 :45 p.m. 
Another person, not involved in the accident, was considered by an 
intern to be more in need of immediate attention and was given the 
only available bed in the hospital. The intern in charge examined 
the boy's abdomen and checked his pulse and blood pressure but gave 
no further medical attention. No licensed physician was called. When 
the boy attempted to leave his stretcher, several hospital employees 
assisted in holding him down, with one person applying pressure to 
his back. After forty-five minutes at the defendant hospital, the boy 
was taken to another hospital where he died at 1:00 a.m. from a rup-
tured liver and internal bleeding. 
New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Frazier.54 A man, bleeding profusely 
from a gunshot wound in the arm, was taken to the emergency room 
of the hospital. Three nurses saw his condition but did nothing to 
stop the bleeding. The head nurse called a doctor but did not inform 
him of the extent of the bleeding. The doctor examined the man 
but did not stop the bleeding. On learning that the patient was a 
veteran, the doctor made arrangements for his transfer to a veteran's 
hospital and left him with the head nurse. The nurse was to advise 
the doctor of changes in the patient's condition. In spite of shock 
53. 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1961). 
54. 245 Miss. 185, 146 S.2d 882 (1962). 
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symptoms, however, she made no report to the doctor. After two 
hours in the emergency room, the patient was transferred to the 
veteran's hospital where he died within a half hour from hemorrhage 
and shock. 
Tacit adherence to the Crews Draconian principle probably 
accounts for the conclusion in these two cases that the deceased 
had been legally accepted as a "patient."55 Neither opinion, how-
ever, offers a satisfactory explanation of how one becomes a pa-
tient or why a patient deserves better treatment in a medical emer-
gency than one who, though a nonpatient, is nevertheless physically 
present. Hospital personnel in both cases exercised control over the 
patient by accepting him into the emergency room with the obvious 
intention of rendering some aid, but none was, in fact, rendered. A 
voluntary undertaking to render service, standing alone, has not 
been sufficient for other courts to find patient status, or it has not 
been necessary in order to hold the hospital liable. The only signifi-
cant difference between these cases and other emergency cases is 
that here the persons were kept in the emergency room for a sub-
stantial time without receiving any aid and were later transferred 
somewhere else to receive the necessary attention. Except for these 
two cases, the law appears to be that a person does not achieve 
patient status until treatment starts, except in cases of formal admis-
sion for general hospital services. 
Perhaps Ball and Frazier represent attempts to come within the 
exception of voluntary undertaking-assumed duty. The courts may 
have been seeking added assurance for their result by finding a 
hospital-patient relationship, which means a special dependence 
contract and another possible exception to the general nonfeasance 
rule. These cases may mean that, if the hospital-patient relationship 
exists, the hospital has a duty to render whatever treatment the 
condition requires and that admission may occur without any formal-
ities or any treatment. Consider the following language from the 
Frazier case: 
In an emergency, the victim should be permitted to leave the hos-
pital only after he has been seen, examined and offered reasonable 
first aid. A hospital rendering emergency treatment is obligated to 
do that which is immediately and reasonably necessary for the preser-
vation of the life, limb, or health of the patient. It should not dis-
charge a patient in critical condition without furnishing or pro-
curing suitable medical attention.56 
55. Cases cited in notes 53 and 54 supra. 
56. 245 Miss. 185 at 197, 146 S.2d 882 at 887 (1962). 
1468 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:1455 
In neither case was the injured person formally admitted: in 
Ball the deceased received only a superficial examination upon en-
tering the emergency room and was kept forty-five minutes before 
being transferred; in Frazier a doctor was summoned and the injured 
man's name was recorded, but he remained for nv-o hours. Whether 
anything less than forty-five minutes would create the hospital-pa-
tient relationship is unclear, but if this is enough, then practically 
anyone in distress who gets through the emergency room door may 
be a "patient." This may mean that the amazing potency of the dic-
tum in Crews has evaporated, just as privity of contract in defective 
products negligence cases disappeared when Judge Cardozo began to 
write the opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,51 and for very 
similar reasons. The common law regurgitates what it cannot digest. 
The results of Ball and Frazier could be rationalized under other 
tort rules. If an individual undertakes to aid another and should 
recognize that the aid is necessary for the other's protection, he will 
be liable for harm resulting from failure to use due care to perform 
his undertaking if his failure increases the risk of harm to the other.li8 
The hospitals in both cases materially increased the time before aid 
was received. This delay itself might have been a significant factor 
in causing death; surely it increased the risk of harm. On this theory 
of liability, however, the existence of a hospital-patient relationship 
would be unnecessary to liability. Injecting the hospital-patient re-
lationship into the cases makes them appear to be breach of contract 
or wrongful discharge cases, and this compounds confusion. 
3. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid, but 
then released the applicant giving him reason to believe the 
emergency had passed, when in fact his condition was the same 
or had been worsened by the treatment. 
Barcia v. Society of New York Hospital.59 On the advice of a 
family physician, the parents of a two-year old girl took her to the 
hospital. A physician employed by the hospital gave her an examina-
tion, including a chest X-ray, blood count, and throat culture. He 
decided that her condition was not critical enough to require hos-
pitalization. The child's condition deteriorated after she returned to 
her home. Again she was taken to the hospital on the family phy-
57. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
58. R.EsTATEMENT {SECOND} OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
59. 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1963). 
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sician's advice. This time she was formally admitted but died several 
hours later. Another physician at the hospital asked the parents 
"why didn't you bring her sooner, I might have been able to save 
her."60 
Reeves v. North Broward Hospital District.61 The patient was 
given a urine test and a blood pressure check by a hospital resident 
physician. He diagnosed the case as hypertension and gave the man 
sedatives. A relief doctor came on and signed the release of the pa-
tient into the custody of two brothers without seeing or treating the 
patient. Eleven hours later the man died of a subdural hematoma 
en route back to the hospital. 
Bourgeois v. Dade County.62 A man was found unconscious in his 
undenvear on the lawn in front of a hotel and was taken by police to 
the emergency room of the hospital. An intern found his pulse and 
chest sounds normal. The man was unable to give his name or a 
history of his condition, and the intern made no other effort to ob-
tain a hisory. No X-rays were taken. There was conflicting testimony 
about alcohol on the patient's breath. After a superficial examination, 
the intern released the patient to the police as a drunk. Several hours 
later he died in a jail cell from punctures of the thoracic cavity by 
broken ribs. 
Ruvio v. North Broward Hospital District.63 plaintiff's husband 
was taken to the hospital emergency room on a Sunday. Under nor-
mal practice the resident physician on duty in the emergency room 
screened emergency cases. On Sundays, however, although a physician 
was on call, the emergency room nurses screened patients and called 
the physician only if there was a question in their minds about the 
existence of an emergency. Two nurses refused the applicant admis-
sion or any treatment without a doctor's order on the ground that 
no emergency existed. A friend took him directly to an outside phys-
ician who found him to be an emergency case and had him admitted 
to the same hospital. He died two days later of a coronary infarction. 
Barcia involves both an undertaking to treat and a negligent 
diagnosis, 64 but judgment for the plaintiff was rendered simply on 
the basis of negligence-without any discussion of duty to treat. The 
case is an example of aid given without due care which unreasonably 
60. 39 Misc. 2d at 527, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 375. 
61. 191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). 
62. 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957). 
63. 186 S.2d 45 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 195 S.2d 567 (Fla. 1966). 
6'1. Barcia v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 39 Misc. 2d 526, 241 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 
1963). 
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increases the risk of harm to another by creating a false sense of 
security and preventing the person from seeking aid elsewhere. The 
delayed admittance due to the initial inaccurate diagnosis was ap-
parently crucial to the patient's chances. 
In Reeves there was both negligent diagnosis and negligent treat-
ment. 65 The Florida appellate court reversed a directed verdict for 
the defendant on the grounds that the evidence presented a jury ques-
tion as to whether the hospital "did not exercise such reasonable care 
toward the deceased as his known condition required."66 Perhaps 
this means that a hospital taking a patient into the emergency room 
may not terminate treatment until it does whatever the patient's true 
condition reasonably requires. Reading the case more narrowly, it 
may mean that the treatment and diagnosis constitute actionable 
neglect only because they created a false sense of security in the 
patient and deterred him from seeking other aid. As in Barcia, the 
hospital's intervention may have left the patient in a worse condi-
tion than he was before. Had the hospital given no aid, he would 
perhaps have received the necessary and proper care at another 
facility. 
Bourgeois61 was also a case of negligent diagnosis. In fact, the 
staff pathologist and emergency room supervising physician testified 
that improper procedures were followed. Again, recovery for the 
plaintiff may be rationalized on the basis of an intervenor who puts 
his potential beneficiary in worse condition than he was before. The 
hospital personnel not only caused movement and handling by the 
police which aggravated the patient's condition, but they also pre-
vented other proper care. In Ruvio,68 however, a directed verdict for 
defendant was affirmed on appeal. Here the time period before death 
was substantially longer than in the cases previously discussed. Af-
firmance was on the grounds that plaintiff failed to prove that any 
action or inaction by the hospital staff was the proximate cause of 
death or that the hospital staff had breached any duty. There was 
no indication, however, that the court thought that no duty to the 
deceased existed. 
4. After the hospital exercised control, it gave some aid to ap-
plicant and sent him elsewhere for further treatment. 
65. 191 S.2d 307 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966). 
66. 191 S.2d at 309. 
67. 99 S.2d 575 (Fla. 1957). 
68. Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 S.2d 45 (4th D. Ct. App. Fla. 1966), cert. 
denied, 195 S.2d 567 (1966). 
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Le]uene Road Hospital, Inc. v. Watson.69 A mother took her son 
to the hospital for a scheduled appendicitis operation. The boy was 
examined, given medication, and dressed in a hospital gown. After 
waiting two hours the boy and his mother were required to leave 
because the mother could not produce 200 dollars in cash. Although 
there was evidence that the boy was violently ill at the time of leav-
ing the hospital, they were obliged to go to another hospital where 
the operation was performed. 
Jones v. City of New York.70 The patient suffered an abdominal 
stab wound. After examining her and cleaning and dressing the 
wound, an emergency room intern arranged for her transfer from 
the charitable hospital to a city hospital for further treatment. She 
died there during an exploratory operation. 
In this factual pattern, unless the examination and treatment 
given are negligent, it seems more difficult in legal theory to hold the 
hospital liable than in the prior three factual categories. The vol-
untary undertaking-assumed duty rule in nonhospital contexts is 
that the intervenor may terminate his services at any time as long as 
he does not leave his intended beneficiary in a worse position. He is 
neither required to continue his assistance indefinitely or to do every-
thing it is within his power to do.71 Both of these cases, nevertheless, 
held the hospital liable. 
Watson, which is relevant even though not an emergency room 
case, avoided the rule of no duty to continue treatment by finding 
that the plaintiff had been accepted as a patient. Once patient status 
is achieved, a dependent contractual relationship exists and the 
patient may not be discharged if the removal aggravates his condition 
or increases the risk of harm. The extent of control by the hospital 
necessary to create the hospital-patient relationship was not discussed. 
In Jones the hospital was held liable on the theory that the de-
ceased was denied necessary treatment at the emergency stage and 
that the transfer contributed to her death. The court did not find 
that the deceased was a patient. Perhaps the court was saying that 
after exercising some control the hospital should have done every-
thing within its power to minister to the person's needs and that it 
did not successfully shift that duty to the second hospital. Again, 
this seems to be a different voluntary-undertaking rule than that 
which applies in the nonhospital context. 
69. 171 S.2d 202 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1965). 
70. 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1955). 
71. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
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5. The hospital refused to exercise control over the applicant 
and did not give any aid. The applicant was turned away at the 
door. 
O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital.72 Plaintiff's husband awoke at 
5:00 a.m. experiencing severe chest and arm pains and breathing 
difficulties. He dressed and walked with his wife three blocks to the 
hospital emergency room. The wife explained to the nurse in charge 
that he was very ill, and she thought he was suffering from a heart 
attack. Upon discovering that the applicants were members of a 
particular insurance plan group, the nurse explained that the hos-
pital did not treat members of that group but offered to call a phys-
ician who was associated with the plan. The husband spoke with 
that doctor. Exactly what transpired is unknown, but the doctor did 
not come to check him or seek his admission to the hospital. At this 
point plaintiff requested that her husband be treated by a hospital 
doctor since it was an emergency. The nurse disregarded the request 
with the explanation that he could see his own physician later in the 
morning. The husband died while undressing after returning home. 
Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove.73 Plaintiff's child had 
been under a doctor's care for three days. By the fourth day the child 
had not begun to improve. Knowing their physician was not in his 
office on that day, the parents took the child to the hospital emer-
gency room. They explained to the nurse that the child had had a 
continuously high temperature, diarrhea, and two sleepless nights. 
The nurse responded that the hospital could not give any treatment 
because of the danger of conflict with the attending physician's 
medication. The nurse did not examine the child in any way, but 
did make an unsuccessful effort to reach the family physician. She 
suggested that they return the next day when the pediatric clinic 
opened. The child died from bronchial pneumonia that afternoon 
at home. 
In these cases, the hospital, rather than exercising any control or 
giving any treatment, refused to treat the applicant. One might think 
that the argument still open under the general rule of no duty to act 
would permit the hospital to escape liability in such circumstances. 
None of the general exceptions is applicable here. First, no inno-
cent or negligent conduct of the hospital has caused the peril to the 
sick person, and no force threatening peril is under the hospital's 
72. 11 App. Div. 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). 
73. 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
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control. Second, there has been no undertaking to aid the person in 
peril. Third, there is no special relationship of dependence between 
the hospital and prospective patient since by all the tests there is no 
patient. In both O'Neill and Manlove, as may be guessed from 
this elaborate preface, the courts found the hospitals liable. 
Both cases had these facts in common: (I) the person seeking aid 
was refused examination as well as treatment; (2) the nurse called 
a physician for the person; and (3) the individual died shortly after 
leaving the hospital. The intermediate New York appellate court in 
O'Neill split three to two in reversing a dismissal of plaintiff's claim. 
The court found that the evidence was sufficient to create nvo issues 
which should have been submitted to the jury: Did the nurse's ac-
tions amount to a voluntary undertaking-assumed duty by the hos-
pital to provide medical care, or did she merely perform a personal 
favor? And, if the hospital assumed such an obligation, was it reason-
ably fulfilled? An effort was thus made to bring the case within the 
orthodox voluntary undertaking principles. The plaintiff's case 
cannot be made to fit this bed, however, without changing the re-
quirements for this exception as established in nonhospital contexts. 
The opinion maintained that after exercising any control the hos-
pital must do everything within its power to minister to the needs of 
the person. If any control was exercised, it was certainly minimal. 
The 1"1anlove case more squarely presents the question at issue 
here.74 The complaint itself was based on the hospital's refusal to 
treat in an emergency case. The Delaware court did not find that the 
sick child was a "patient." The court emphasized that it was not 
treating the case as one in which the hospital "assumed" to treat 
the applicant. It treated the issue as being whether the hospital had 
a duty to treat the person at all, and not whether the hospital was 
negligent in the treatment it gave. Making its views quite clear, the 
court held that a hospital cannot refuse aid in a medical emergency 
and remanded for a determination of whether an unmistakable 
emergency existed. 
74. Manlove is discussed in Recent Development, Duty To Admit Emergency Pa-
tients Imposed on Private Hospital .Maintaining Emergency Ward, 62 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 
730 (1962); Recent Development, Private Hospital .Must Admit Unmistakable Emer-
gency Cases, 14 STAN. L. R.Ev. 910 (1962); Note, Torts-Hospitals-Undertakings-Duty 
of Private Hospital .Maintaining Emergency Ward To Treat in Case of Unmistakable 
Emergency, 40 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 732 (1962); Recent Case, Torts-Liability of Private Hos-
pital-Refusal of Treatment in Emergency Ward, 31 U. CrNc. L. R.Ev. 183 (1962); Case 
Comment, Torts-Private Hospitals-Liability for Refusal To Provide Emergency 
Treatment, 64 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 234 (1962). For a general discussion of this issue see 
Note, .Must a Private Hospital Be a Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 475 (1965). 
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In taking this position, the Supreme Court of Delaware rejected 
the holding of the lower court which held for plaintiff on the 
theory that receipt of public funds and an exemption from taxation 
converted the defendant private hospital into a public hospital. 
Clearly then, in Delaware the Crews rule is limited to provide only 
that a hospital owes no duty to accept patients to cases of acceptance 
for ordinary hospital services. In emergency cases, the applicant seek-
ing medical aid in reliance upon a well-established custom of the 
hospital to render emergency care has a right to receive such aid and 
the hospital a corresponding duty. Duty and the resulting liability, 
according to the Delaware court, rests on the existence of an un-
mistakable emergency and reliance by the prospective patient on 
the hospital's custom to treat emergency cases. 
This formulation may present difficulties in proving reliance 
upon a custom. Perhaps fewer doctrinal difficulties would be en-
countered if Manlove were regarded as an expanded voluntary 
undertaking case. Though the court initially rejected this approach 
-no doubt to emphasize its rejection of prior cases-it later ad-
mitted the analogy of the facts to cases of negligent termination of 
gratuitous undertakings, citing the predecessor of section 323 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Such a rationale involves an expan-
sion of the voluntary undertaking concept as applied in prior cases. 
Prior cases, especially the O'Neill case, went to great lengths to find 
an undertaking to provide aid to the particular prospective patient. 
In Manlove, the term means an undertaking to provide aid in all 
emergency cases in general for which a refusal in any particular case 
would constitute a breach of duty. There could be no reliance on an 
undertaking under the prior cases until the particular prospective 
patient presented himself for treatment and the hospital in some 
way indicated an intention to treat him. This explains the attempts 
of courts to find that the hospital exercised some kind of control over 
the person or that the person had legally become a patient. Clearly, 
Manlove goes further. 
Such an expanded concept of undertaking may be a step other 
courts would be reluctant to take, but it is also true that few cases 
have arisen that could not be neatly fitted within an orthodox ex-
ception to the old rule of no duty. The Manlove court's emphasis 
upon an established custom is most likely an attempt to state a 
requirement of reasonable reliance by the prospective patient upon 
the general undertaking. The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes 
liability for harm caused by an undertaking to provide aid depend 
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upon increased risk or reliance.711 And, reasonable reliance must be 
based upon a sufficient undertaking by the defendant. Reliance may 
be thought reasonable in a case like Manlove, because the expense 
required to open an emergency room is sufficient indication of seri-
ous intent to undertake to render aid in medical emergencies. 
Opening an emergency facility, however, hardly amounts to either 
contract or a gratuitous promise when viewed from the position of 
the hospital, and it is certainly not an "undertaking" as that term is 
used in the Restatement. 
Ill. THE LAW AND SOCIETAL ATTITUDES 
There is a striking divergence between the general rules of law 
relating to the provision of emergency medical service by hospitals 
and the general consensus of lay and professional opinion. The ration-
ale supporting the general rule that there is no duty to act is in con-
flict with the generally accepted conception of the role of the modern 
hospital. Further, the result permitted by the rule is felt to be shock-
ing and morally reprehensible by all, apparently, except the legally 
trained. We have already noted that some courts, reflecting this dis-
satisfaction, have been able to permit recovery by skirting but still 
rendering homage to the rule. 
The most convincing justification for the general rule is the pro-
tection of individualism. The common-law courts, following their 
highly individualistic philosophy, refused to force men to be unsel-
fish or to require them to be Good Samaritans.76 Individualistic 
values are undeniably basic to Anglo-American law, but more im-
portant to contemporary American society is the value and worth of 
human life. The development of modern American hospitals has 
been spurred more by this human concern than by selfishness or 
profit.77 
75. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). If reliance is the basis of the duty 
and consequent recovery, some nasty complications may be lurking as to the amount 
of damages recoverable. Awards may be limited to the harm actually caused by the 
reliance only. A similar problem is presented when a promise is enforced under § 90 
of the Restatement of Contracts, where a recovery may be limited to the reliance 
damage. 14 STAN. L. REv. 910, 915 (1962). 
76. See Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLUM, L. REv. 631 
(1952). 
77, M, MACEACHERN, HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ch. 1 (1957); MOD· 
ERN CONCEPrS OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATION ch. 1 ij. Owen ed. 1962); Faxon, The Place 
of the Hospital in the Social Order, in THE HOSPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE ch. 8 
(N. Faxon ed. 1949); Goldwater, Concerning Hospital Origins, in THE HosPITAL IN 
MODERN SoCIETY ch. I, § I (A. Bachmeyer 8e G. Hartman eds. 1943). 
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Such motives as philanthropy, sympathy, charity, and compassion 
are almost universally accepted as underlying the founding and op-
eration of hospitals. The hint of a profit motive in hospital operation 
has been particularly subject to criticism from members of the medi-
cal profession.78 Considering hospitals as created for service to society, 
one doctor wrote that "(t)he public servant, institutional or indi-
vidual, who reveals for an instant a selfish aim is instantly discredited . 
. . . Surely we may look fonvard to the day when all hospitals shall 
present to society harmonious, united service, adopted with the 
greatest care and in absqlute unselfishness to the needs of the time."70 
If most hospitals are motivated by such ideals, as experience would 
suggest, it is peculiarly inappropriate to attribute to them a desire 
to refuse emergency medical aid to those in need of care. 
There are factual differences between hospitals and other business 
institutions which may support a different legal rule in medical 
emergency situations. The profit motive-incorporating a notion of 
absolute managerial discretion to deal with all parties so as to ma.xi-
mize profits-is at the heart of private enterprise and is the great 
stimulus to efficiency and improved service. When a business enter-
prise ceases to be profitable, it generally liquidates and retires from 
the business scene. A hospital cannot quit so easily. Its worth to the 
community is not measured by net earnings, but by the quantity and 
quality of services which it renders. 80 While some would argue that 
profit seeking would force hospitals to be more efficient, it has been 
deplored as an organizational objective for hospitals and criticized 
as an obstacle to improvement in the quality of medical care.81 The 
plain fact is that not even the private hospital operates or is regarded 
as an ordinary private business where unfettered managerial discre-
tion is required. If unable to support itself with income from patients 
who pay for their services, even the private hospital does not usually 
close; it is supported by the community through private and public 
assistance. With the profit motive and its concomitant need for 
managerial discretion inapplicable, then, the way is open to impose 
upon hospitals some sort of duty to act in emergency situations. 
More indicative of the special role which the hospital plays in the 
community is the position of many members of the medical profes-
sion who speak in terms of the public's right to a coordinated, com-
78. See HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 293-94 CT. Knowles ed. 1965). 
79. The Hospital in Modern Society, supra note 77, at 17. 
80. Id., ch. 1, § 4. 
81. HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 79, at 293-94. 
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munity-wide program for the best possible medical services, includ-
ing adequate provision for emergency patients.82 To speak in these 
terms is to recognize the oven\Thelming importance to our society of 
emergency medical services. Indeed, because of this important role, 
there has been some consideration given to the suggestion that hos-
pitals be regulated as public utilities.83 Hospitals certainly possess 
some of the characteristics of public utilities: they characteristically 
enjoy monopolistic positions in many communities and provide ser-
vices in which the public has a tremendous interest. A recent socio-
logical study of community hospitals concluded that effective hospital 
medical care and treatment is possible only with the mobilization of 
total community effort.84 As the authors suggest, this effort may be 
better mobilized in the form of public-utility-style regulation of 
striking practical differences. 
It appears, then, that the values associated with the origin of 
hospitals as well as the best principles of their operation are in con-
flict with the values traditionally thought appropriate in the context 
of a fortuitous encounter between two men, one in need of emer-
gency aid and the other having power to give it. Today, the hospital, 
particularly the emergency room, is vital to the community; it can-
not be characterized as the locus of a chance encounter. A rule which 
evolved in the context of independent medical practitioners-and 
which today is criticized even in that context-should not be applied 
to hospitals automatically and without consideration. 
Beyond these criticisms of the no-duty rule's rational underpin-
nings, many, especially those without legal training, feel that the 
rule permits a morally reprehensible result. It permits hospitals 
arbitrarily to refuse aid in emergency cases, even though the hospital 
personnel recognize that they have a moral duty to provide facilities 
and care in such cases.85 Surely it is the general recognition and dis-
charge of this duty by the hospitals that accounts for the relatively 
few reported cases on denial of treatment. Hospital officials and ad-
ministrators are acutely aware of the censure they face if their doors 
are closed to those in need. Aside from the risk of potential litiga-
82. Compare Stichter, Medical Staffing of Emergency Rooms: Legal and Ethical 
Considerations, 62 THE Omo STATE MEDICAL J. 600-601, and Faxon, supra note 77, 
ch. 8, with HOSPITALS, DocroRS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 78, at 293. 
83. Horty, When Hospital Has Emergency Room It May Be Required To Give 
Treatment, 96 THE MODERN HOSPITAL, 103 (1961). 
84. I. BELKNAP&: J. STEINLE, THE COMMUNITY AND !TS HOSPITALS (1963). 
85. MODERN CONCEPTS OF HOSPITAL .ADllnNISTRATION 330 CT. Owen ed. 1962). 
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tion, 86 any such denial of emergency service may have a substantial 
adverse effect on the hospital's public image.87 
More than half a century ago, Professor Bohlen wrote that "it 
should not be forgotten that a system of law which lags too far be-
hind the universally received conceptions of abstract justice, in the 
end must lose the sympathy, the confidence, perhaps even the respect 
of the community."88 The fact that not only the public, but also 
those most intimately concerned with the operation of hospitals, feel 
that hospitals should provide emergency aid to those in distress argues 
eloquently for imposing a legal duty. At times, it seems the only ones 
who have anything to say for the no-duty principle are the lawyers 
and judges. Further, if it is true, as Holmes wrote, that the law is a 
prediction of what judges will do, then the no-duty rule may no 
longer be the law in the hospital emergency room context. All mod-
ern cases fall into the exceptions, and the only support for the no-duty 
principles is in dicta and secondary authorities. 
IV. SOME .ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
Many years ago, one of the great men of American law proposed 
a general rule-to be enforced by criminal penalties as well as civil 
liability-requiring that aid be given to those in peril.89 The lia-
bility would attach to anyone failing to interfere to save another 
from imminent death or great bodily harm when he might do so 
with little or no inconvenience to himself, if death or great harm did 
follow as a consequence of his inaction. Although American juris-
dictions have failed to adopt this proposal,90 it is significant that other 
countries, especially in Europe, have created such statutory duties, 
generally enforceable by criminal penalties.91 
86. 2 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH HEALTH LAw CENTER, HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL 7-8 
(1961): 
Since the risk of incurring liability is much greater than the inconvenience or cost 
of furnishing such treatment, it is suggested that the hospital furnish the neces-
sary care routinely so as to insure the exercise of reasonable conduct and not 
aggravate the condition •••• It is in the hospital's interest to prevent suits from 
arising out of emergency room situations by furnishing routine care to minimize 
injury and prevent harm. 
87. Davis, Hospitals Neglect Public Relations Aspects of Emergency Department, 
102 THE MODERN HOSPITAL 10 (1964); Horty, supra note 83, at 106, 159; Seifert &: 
Johnstone, Meeting the Emergency Department Crisis, 40 HOSPITALS 55, 57 (1966). 
88. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. 
L. REv. 316, 337 (1908). 
89. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 113 (1902). 
90. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336; Seavey, I Am Not l\Jy Guest's 
Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1960). 
91. Criminal penalties in the form of a fine or imprisonment are the normal sane• 
tion, though in some instances civil remedies are available. See Note, Failure To 
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In the United States, only Illinois has imposed a specific 
statutory obligation on both public and private hospitals to render 
emergency aid.92 The Illinois statute imposes a fine on the defendant 
hospital for each offense.93 The selection of criminal over civil sanc-
tions reflects the strong policy considerations favoring such a duty 
to render aid. The duty created is specifically and narrowly limited 
to hospitals where surgical operations are performed; it arises only 
when emergency treatment or first aid is needed in case of injury or 
acute medical conditions. This limitation deserves special note. 
Unlike Professor Ames' proposal-discussed at the outset of this 
section--or the European laws, the Illinois statute does not create a 
general affirmative duty upon all citizens to aid those in peril. The 
duty to aid created by this statute avoids some of the objections that 
have been raised to a general affirmative duty: (1) that it is too diffi-
cult to single out which person should be liable when many people 
could have assisted; (2) that it is too difficult to delineate all the cir-
cumstances in which a duty to aid would arise; (3) that the law 
should not enforce unselfishness; and (4) that such a duty would 
impose a form of slavery and infringe on individual freedom, which 
is fundamental in our society.94 
The first objection is obviously inapplicable to the Illinois statute. 
There is only one possible defendant: a hospital which refuses emer-
Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952); Note, Must a Private 
Hospital Be a Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475 (1965). Belgian, Danish, Dutch, 
French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Swiss, and Turk-
ish codes contain or have contained such statutes. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: 
The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1073 (1961). 
92. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111½, §§ 86-87 (1966). Section 86 reads as follows: 
No hospital, either public or private, where surgical operations are performed, 
operating in this State shall refuse to give emergency medical treatment or first 
aid to any applicant who applies for the same in case of injury or acute medical 
condition where the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious 
illness. 
It was first enacted in 1927 and amended in 1963. A Pennsylvania statute requires all 
hospitals to have at least one licensed physician or resident intern on call at all times, 
but neither emergencies nor any duty to render aid is mentioned. The sanction is the 
withholding of funds by the Department of Public Welfare. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§§ 435-36 (196!). 
93. The fine is small: "not less than $50.00 nor more than $200.00." ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. Ill½, § 87 (1966). Presumably civil liability could also be founded upon a breach 
of the duty. The only case citing this section was a civil case in which a hospital suc-
cessfully sued a township for services provided an indigent, the court citing this 
statute as creating a duty to provide the services, thereby making prompt payment by 
the governmental unit proper under another statute. St. John's Hosp. v. Town of 
Capitol, 75 Ill. App. 2d 222, 226, 220 N.E.2d 333, 335 (App. Ct. 1966). 
94. The arguments are summarized in Note, Moral Challenge to the Legal Doctrine 
of Rescue, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 334, 350 (1965). For a discussion of arguments for 
and against general affirmative duties see Note, Must a Private Hospital Be a Good 
Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475, 486 (1965). 
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gency aid. The second objection is similarly inapplicable. The con-
cern is not with all circumstances in which a duty may arise, but only 
with a "medical emergency" in the hospital emergency room. It is 
no real objection that this will require the courts to distinguish 
between emergencies and nonemergencies: courts make analogous 
distinctions in almost every case on the docket. In fact, medical 
evidence should make performance of this task more precise than in 
many other types of cases and the traditional reasonable man stand-
ard so familiar to the courts in so many other negligence situations 
would seem apt. The third and fourth objections seem inappropriate 
as applied to corporate or governmental enterprises, which most 
hospitals are. In the hospital context these two objections amount 
to a claim of the right to absolute managerial discretion that is cer-
tainly open to dispute. 
The general rule that the hospital owes no duty to aid in a medi-
cal emergency undoubtedly emanated from the companion principle 
that a physician is under no duty to give medical aid even in an 
emergency.95 The third and fourth objections are more tenable when 
directed to the question of whether an individual physician is to be 
regarded by the law as a public utility who must enter into contracts 
and render his services irrespective of his own wishes. There are 
many distinctions that may properly be made between a hospital 
that maintains an emergency room and the typical physician, even 
when he is in his own office. We need not enslave practicing physi-
cians in order to require hospitals to be the Good Samaritans their 
emergency room signs and public image proclaim them to be. 
Such a narrowly limited statute, then, seems to stand up well 
against the traditional arguments and has a good deal to recommend 
it. In the absence of this sort of statute, however, can the hospital be 
found liable within the rubrics of common-law tort? To hold a 
hospital liable for failure to confer a benefit may seem to violate the 
generally accepted definition of tort: an injury inflicted upon one 
person by the act of another, which act was intended or could rea-
sonably be calculated to result in harm.96 This definition, however, 
is today not exclusive; the law of torts already requires that some 
95. E.g., Butterworth v. Swint, 53 Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936); Hurley v. 
Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 
744 (1931); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 
549 (1959). 
96. Prof. Bohlen suggested that the term "tort" should have been limited to acts of 
this nature. Bohlen, The Moral Duty To Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 
U. PA. L. REv. 217, 221-22 (1908). 
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acts be done. Because of this dual nature of tort law, it is important 
to review the relationship between affirmative legal duties and mis-
feasance torts in considering whether the law should require hospitals 
to render emergency treatment. 
The early English common law had no logical classification of 
legal rights and obligations. Litigants were compelled to fit their 
claims into the procedural forms of trespass or trespass on the case. 
Many rights and duties with logically different attributes were, con-
sequently, indiscriminately classified as torts. Only because of their 
commercial importance did the affirmative duties today classified as 
contracts become a distinct branch of law. Bohlen felt that many 
other affirmative duties should likewise have been separated from 
the body of tort law.97 This would have avoided the confusion and 
unfortunate decisions resulting from the failure to identify the salient 
features of different legal rights and obligations and the considera-
tions underlying them. Professor Bohlen proposed that at least 
the duties to take positive action be given the status of a distinct 
class within tort law. This class would be subdivided into four 
groups: (1) obligations created by statute; (2) obligations arising from 
family relationships; (3) obligations attached by custom as an in-
cident to tenure of real estate, or incumbency of office; and (4) 
obligations "annexed by the policy of the law as necessary incidents 
to a relation voluntarily assumed .... "98 Any common-law duty upon 
hospitals to provide medical aid in emergencies must be "annexed by 
the policy of the law," and, therefore, falls in Bohlen's last category. 
Affirmative duties created by legal policy share important char-
acteristics that serve to distinguish the group and to limit its ex-
pansion. First, they are similar to contract duties. Although not speci-
fically agreed to by the parties, volition at some stage on the part of 
the obligated party is essential to the creation of the duty. The vol-
untary relationship of master and servant, for example, imposes upon 
the master an obligation to provide a safe place to work and safe 
equipment to use.99 Significantly, the employer is also obliged to 
render emergency medical assistance to employees injured on the 
job and unable to care for themselves.100 Similarly, a voluntary inter-
vention to render emergency aid may impose a duty to render all the 
aid needed by the imperiled victim, as where the intervention causes 
97. Id. at 222·226. 
98. Id. at 226. 
99. E.g., Palmer v. Julian, 161 Kan. 619, 170 P.2d 813 (1946). 
100. E.g., Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40 A.2d 562 (Ct. Err.&: App. 
1945). 
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the victim to forgo other sources of aid.101 Second, a necessary basis 
for the duty is always the ability of one to afford the protection and 
the helpless inability of the other to protect himself.102 Consequently, 
the potential beneficiary of the duty necessarily relies upon the ob-
liged party-"necessarily" either as a result of the beneficiary's in-
ability to help himself or of his failure to help himself because of 
ignorance of facts known to or controlled by the party obliged.103 
The relation of hospital and emergency patient seems "volun-
tarily assumed" by the hospital when one considers the total context. 
The hospital has voluntarily established an emergency facility and 
voluntarily made its existence known to the public. While this 
may not be the degree of specific volition required in some other 
relationships, it is done with the knowledge of the common under-
standing and growing belief that the emergency room is there for 
the benefit of the public-that there may be a right to such care. 
Further, the "policy of the law" would be served by creating a legal 
obligation for hospitals with emergency rooms to care for those who 
seek aid. It translates into law a moral obligation that is almost unan-
imously recognized. It would give legal support to the importance of 
the individual human being by preventing needless loss of life or 
needless impairment of productive capacity. 
It seems altogether appropriate, then, to propose that a duty 
should be imposed by law upon hospitals that maintain emergency 
rooms to render treatment to all persons seeking emergency aid. Any 
hospital negligently failing in this duty should incur civil liability 
to the extent of the damage caused by the failure to treat. The stan-
dard for this negligence liability ought to be that emergency aid 
which ordinary, reasonable, and prudent hospital employees would 
have provided.104 
101. REs'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323, comment c, at 137 (1965). 
102. Bohlen referred to the obliged party as the one "having exclusive control of 
the cause of harm." Bohlen, supra note 96 at 233. In a strict sense the hospital has no 
relation to the cause of harm in a typical emergency room case. As in other cases of 
detrimental reliance, however, there is a refined sense in which the hospital does 
have control over harm from aggravation: but for the hospital's false inducement of 
reliance the harm from aggravation might have been avoided. 
103. The two characteristics mentioned here are discussed by Bohlen. Id. at 228-29. 
104. The tort liability of hospitals ordinarily depends on agency principles, with 
the employee being primarily liable for his breach of duty, and the hospital being 
secondarily liable. In many hospitals the physician in the emergency room may be a 
member of the medical staff who is not an employee of the hospital and whose tortious 
conduct may not be imputed to the hospital. This may mean in such cases that the 
physician alone and not the hospital will be liable for breaching the proposed duty. 
If the governing board of the hospital had adopted a policy resulting in violations of 
the proposed duty then this would be a so-called "corporate" tort, though the distinc• 
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Lawyers, however, require a theory acceptable under common-
law principles that will accommodate this duty. The absence of 
the duty at the present time only reflects the traditional inertia of 
the law and not a lack of legal theories to supply an acceptable solu-
tion.1011 Indeed, Manlove suggests two theories which could support 
the duty to treat: the public utility theory and the reliance theory.106 
The lower court in Manlove followed the first approach, basing 
a quasi-public character upon tax exemptions and state subsidies to 
the private hospital. The public character would obviously be present 
in a public hospital. Once this status is conferred, it is an easy 
step to find a duty to serve all members of the public desiring their 
public or private hospital emergency room services.107 But there are 
several problems with this theory. The test for "public utility" status 
generally has not been dependent upon public financial support but 
upon whether or not the business is sufficiently impressed with a 
public interest.108 While there is some correlation between public 
support and public interest, many subsidized groups such as farmers, 
churches, and charities are not public utilities, and some public 
utilities are not subsidized, such as telephone and telegraph com-
panies. More important, however, is the objection that the public 
utility theory would create conceptual difficulties in the application 
of other rules of hospital law; these difficulties could be avoided by 
alternative theories.100 
Probably the most appropriate legal theory is reliance upon a 
voluntary undertaking. The Delaware Supreme Court in Manlove 
used this theory, expanding it in the process to permit mere reliance 
upon a custom of treating all emergencies. Perhaps the element of 
custom was included because the early case of Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Stewart110 indicated that reliance must be upon an established 
tion seems meaningless when it is considered that the principal (hospital corporation) 
is still being held liable for the acts of its agents (directors or trustees) on the basis 
of what must be an imputation. 
105. It was suggested earlier that nearly all emergency room cases can be explained 
by the rule imposing liability upon one who negligently performs a voluntary under-
taking to provide emergency care and thereby increases the harm or risk of harm to 
the patient. 
106. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 53 Del. 338, 169 A.2d 18, afj'd on other 
grounds, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). 
107. Cf. Town of Wickenberg v. Sabin, 68 Ariz. 75, 200 P.2d 342 (1948). 
108. E.g., Austin Bros. Transfer Co. v. Bloom, 316 Ill. 435, 147 N.E. 387 (1925). 
109. For example, why should the duty to treat be limited to the emergency room 
under this theory? Other matters of policy now controlled by the hospital board of 
trustees would be subject to the same analysis. 
110. 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 843 (1930). 
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custom. A more desirable formulation, however, would require only 
"reasonable reliance."111 In the hospital emergency room context 
reasonable reliance should not require proof of a custom of treating 
all emergencies. The allocation of scarce hospital resources to an 
emergency service should be sufficient to induce any prudent man 
reasonably to believe that the emergency room would perform and 
not refuse the service for which it was established. 
Other theories which might appear to be appropriate, such as the 
invitor-invitee principles of tort law112 or the contract doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, have significant conceptual limitations. The 
former requires the occupier of land to come to the aid of a business 
invitee needing emergency assistance.U3 This duty to an invitee is 
usually justified on the basis of the economic benefit that the oc-
cupier expects to gain from the association.114 The overriding aspect 
of the relationship between emergency room and prospective pa-
tient that calls for a similar rule, however, is not the probable benefit 
to the hospital, but the potential detriment to the patient growing 
out of his reasonable reliance. Not many emergency services can be 
regarded as a potential bonanza of economic benefit. On the other 
hand, it might be argued that a hospital with medical facilities should 
be under no less an obligation than a department store with little or 
none. 
The promissory estoppel theory has even less appeal. It is es-
sentially a contractual mechanism for shifting the burden of loss.115 
When invoked, promissory estoppel functions as a substitute for 
consideration, not as a substitute for a promise. Thus, it holds a 
promisor to an actual promise and is not used to imply a promise for 
111. Requiring emergency room to treat all emergencies should not cause undue 
concern among hospital administrators over their normal operating practices. ,vith 
a reasonable reliance limitation it would be permissible to operate an emergency 
room on a limited schedule if limited resources prohibit twenty-four hour coverage. 
Horty, When a Hospital Starts Emergency Care It Must Provide the Best Service It 
Can, 96 THE MODERN HOSPITAL II6, 165 (1961). The hospital, however, would be re-
sponsible for informing the public of its limited operation by posting emergency 
room hours on entrance signs, in telephone listings, and in other public advertise-
ments. Any restrictions on the type of emergency service provided should be clearly 
publicized to prevent the public from relying upon the hospital for general emergency 
room services. A specialty hospital providing emergency service only in its medical 
specialty, for example, should take reasonable steps to make this known to the 
public. Horty, supra note 83, at 105. 
II2. This approach has been mentioned in 2 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH HEAI.rn 
LAw CENTER, HosPITAL LAw MANUAL 7 (1961) and Note, Must a Private Hospital Be a 
Good Samaritan?, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 475, 482 (1965). 
ll3. L. S. Ayres &: Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); R.EsrATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A)(3) (1965); w. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 337. 
114. W. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 396. 
115. R.EsrATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90, illustration 2, at 111 (1932). 
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the sake of creating liability.116 In emergency room situations like 
those in O'Neill and Manlove, the need to imply a promise to give 
the service negates the applicability of this doctrine. 
Selecting the appropriate theory does not, however, answer all 
the questions. Should there be strict liability for failure to treat an 
emergency? This would mark a radical shift from the present state 
of the law. If not strict liability, what kind of effort will satisfy the 
duty and avoid liability based on negligence principles? The pro-
posed duty involves the treatment of medical emergencies only. If 
there is no duty to treat nonemergencies, there must be some legally 
acceptable procedure for distinguishing emergency from non-
emergency cases. Another legal problem is to decide what due care 
requires to satisfy the duty to identify and treat the emergency 
cases. Obviously, the large general hospital in an urban center is in 
a different situation than a small local hospital, but how much should 
the law take individual circumstances into account? Are there not 
minimum requirements that due care demands from all hospitals 
maintaining emergency rooms? 
Because of the tremendous importance emergency medical care 
has among the total array of medical services, the law should not 
sanction any degree of care below that generally prevailing for other 
medical services. Perhaps hospitals should be required to adopt that 
procedure which will assure that emergency cases are handled with 
the degree of care and skill which an ordinary, reasonable, and 
prudent licensed physician would exercise under similar circum-
stances. The standards for emergency departments formulated by 
the medical profession itself call for diagnosis of emergency room 
cases by licensed physicians only.117 It would be entirely appropriate 
for the courts to apply this as a legal standard.118 There is also much 
to be said for creating this proposed duty by statute. The process of 
adjudication is too slow, and the uncertainties need to be removed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no longer any basis for failing to require that emergency 
medical aid be rendered by hospitals with emergency facilities to 
116. Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal. 2d 449, 112 P.2d 8 (1942); IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 200 (1963). 
117. Standards for Emergency Department in Hospital, 48 BuLL. OF AM. COLLEGE 
OF SURGEONS 112 (May-June 1963). The same standard is dearly implied in T. FLINT, 
EMERGENCY TREATMENT AND l\!ANAGEIIIENT 88 (3d ed. 1964). 
118. In Darling v. Charleston Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), the 
Illinois Supreme Court gave legal recognition to the Standards of the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Hospitals. 
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those in need of such care. Not even the old cases cited in support of 
a lack of duty really support that position, and all the newer cases 
have found detours around the obstacle easily. Hospital personnel 
quite generally assume that there is a duty, and the public makes 
the same assumption. The law should not continue to honor such 
an outworn, unpopular, and barbaric dictum as the one permitting 
the professional "Good Samaritan" to keep its doors closed to the 
victim of a medical emergency. 
